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ABSTRACT 
Renewed U.S. security and diplomatic interest in Sub-
Saharan Africa suggests the need to evaluate previous DSPD 
initiatives.  The ACRF serves as a useful lesson for U.S. 
African Combatant Command (USAFRICOM) in how to communicate 
effectively with African partners.  The aim of the thesis is 
to evaluate the effectiveness of Department of Defense (DoD) 
Defense Support for Public Diplomacy (DPSD) sources and 
messages using the African Crisis Response Force (ACRF) as a 
controlled comparison case study.  Based on this aim, the 
study hypothesizes that a high level source employing a 
tailored message objective to the target audience’s home 
venue would achieve the most favorable effect.  Based on the 
analysis of the ACRF proposal process, the thesis only 
marginally affirms the hypothesis, suggesting that country-
specific contextual factors related to military-to-military 
relations and the condition of public diplomatic relations 
played a more significant role. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
In mid-February 2008, President George Bush conducted a 
five country visit to the continent of Africa.  Prior to the 
trip, the White House Office of the Press Secretary 
published a briefing sheet favorably highlighting the United 
States Government’s partnership with African nations.  The 
sheet focused on three efforts of the United States 
Government in Africa: promoting democracy, overcoming 
poverty, and saving lives. These were represented as the 
focus of the President’s African foreign policy agenda.  At 
the same time, many in the Departments of Defense and State 
were anxious to see where the President would use the 
African visit to complement ongoing efforts towards the 
establishment an African geographic combatant command 
(USAFRICOM). Despite a favorable African response to 
President Bush’s announcement of an $875 million Overseas 
Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), a $675 million 
contribution to the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) 
account in Tanzania,1 and the signing of a bi-lateral trade 
treaty with Rwanda, the President met with severe African 
criticism over multiple facets of USAFRICOM. The contrast in 
reception between American economic and military policies in 
Africa was sharp.  
 
                     
1 White House Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: U.S. Africa 
Policy: An Unparalleled Partnership Strengthening Democracy, Overcoming 
Poverty, and Saving Lives, Fact Sheet ed. (Washington, D.C., 2008), 1, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/02/20080214-11.html 
(accessed February 19, 2008). 
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In Ghana, President Bush responded to specific West 
African concerns regarding the possibility of basing large 
numbers of American troops in Africa and a tacit 
militarization of American foreign policy inside Africa.  
However, to the disappointment of USAFRICOM supporters, Bush 
also announced that the command’s headquarters would be in 
Europe, co-located with European Command, leaving open the 
possibility of a sub-regional office in Liberia.  This 
assuaged African leaders’ concerns about location of the 
command, but not those about its purpose and intent.2 In 
November 2007, President Umaru Yar'Adua of Nigeria, a 
regional leader in West Africa, publicly opposed an American 
base not only in Nigeria, but anywhere in Africa.3  This 
aligned with the position staked out by South Africa two 
months earlier.4  Even Kenya, a state highly supportive of 
American military-to-military training and of the Combined 
Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) base in Djibouti, 
was hesitant about publicly embracing USAFRICOM in general, 
and the basing of its headquarters on the continent in 
particular.5   
 
                     
2 “The U.S. Military has Decided to Keep the Base of its New Africa 
Command in Germany for Now, After Only One African Nation, Liberia, 
Offered to Host It,” BBC News, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7251648.stm (accessed February 19, 
2008). 
3 “The Controversy over Africom,” BBC News, October 3, 2007, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7026197.stm (accessed February 18, 
2008). 
4 "Southern Africa; Plans to Base U.S. Africa Command in Botswana 
Causes Tension," The Nation, September 13, 2007. 
5 "Kenya; U.S. to Consult Kenya On New Africa Command," The Nation, 
February 11, 2007. 
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The new command clearly lacked a sufficient level of 
support from three key partners in sub-Saharan Africa, even 
after its staff devoted significant effort to building such 
support.  USAFRICOM had officially failed to find an African 
state to host its intended continental headquarters, a major 
setback in its efforts to establish and explain itself.  
American government officials viewed the tepid reception of 
USAFRICOM as irrational, since USAFRICOM represents an 
internal re-organization of the Defense Department’s 
bureaucracy intended to focus and increase the effectiveness 
of already existing military efforts in Africa, which are 
widely supported by African states.6  USAFRICOM had tried to 
alay fears that its establishment represented the 
militarization of American foreign policy toward Africa by 
re-asserting that the Department of State, not the 
Department of Defense, would lead diplomatic efforts in the 
region.7 Nevertheless,” reaction to locating the Africa 
Command on the continent [remained] negative.”8   
This was not the first time Sub-Saharan African nations 
had reacted unenthusiastically to a proposed United States 
military assistance initiative.  Reaction to the Clinton 
Administration’s 1996 proposal to create an African 
peacekeeping force, known as African Crisis Response Force 
(ACRF) was more positive that that for AFRICOM, but still 
cool in a number of countries.  The United States had 
                     
6 Transcript: Ambassador Yates Interviewed by ZNBC in Zambia, 
February 27, 2008, http://www.africom.mil/getArticle.asp?art=1669, 
(accessed August 15, 2008). 
7 Sara A. Carter, "General Defends Africa Command; Tells Hill Aim is 
Consolidation," The Washington Times, November 15, 2007. 
8 Africa Command U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. 
Military in Africa, Congressional Research Service (Library of Congress, 
2007). 
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refused to respond to the 1994 genocide in Rwanda in the 
absence of significant national interests, adopting a 
realist “do nothing” approach that contrasted sharply with 
its failed idealist “solve everything” approach in Somalia 
the previous year.9  The negative fallout from both events 
persuaded the U.S. government that it could neither do 
nothing nor solve everything in Africa.  In 1996, Burundi 
seemed to be following Rwanda down the path to genocide.  
Thus the ACRF’s fundamental driving concern was to support 
“African solutions for African problems” in general, and to 
address the Burundi problem in particular.10   
Although most countries invited to participate in ACRF 
agreed to do so, the response from the larger states was 
generally unenthusiastic.  President Nelson Mandela of South 
Africa rebuked the initiative, saying he would prefer an 
African or United Nations supported peacekeeping force for 
Burundi.11  President Sani Abacha of Nigeria, prohibited 
from participation in the ACRF proposal because he headed 
military government, concurred.12  President Daniel arap Moi 
of Kenya also opposed the ACRF for similar reasons.13  In 
light of this negative reception, the ACRF was abandoned in 
favor of a much less ambitious bilateral training program, 
                     
9 "Burundi: President Outlines Urgent Measures to Restore Order, 
Security," Radio Burundi, Bujumbura, in French 1802 gmt, April 25, 1996, 
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, April 28, 1996. 
10 Thomas W. Lippman, "Clinton Administration Revamps Plans for 
Trouble-Shooting All-African Force," The Washington Post, February 9, 
1997, A28. 
11 Barbara Crossette, "In Face of African Crisis, No Plans for World 
Action," The New York Times, November 2, 1996, Late Edition – Final, 6. 
12 John Corry, "Africans Confer on Peace, Security; Nigeria, S. 
Africa, 14 Others Huddle," The Washington Times, December 6, 1997, A6. 
13 "Kenya to Join U.S.-Backed Crisis Response Initiative: Albright," 
Agence France Presse - English. 
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the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI).  However, in 
the years following the withdrawal of the ACRF proposal, the 
African Union (AU) set out to establish an African Standby 
Force, with the same mission, structure and organization 
proposed in the ACRF.  While the Africa Standby Force is 
organized under the auspices of the AU, and operationalized 
through five affiliated sub-regional organizations, it is 
entirely dependent on external funding and airlift, much 
like the proposed ACRF.  Given the ongoing recognition of 
the need for a continental peacekeeping force along the 
lines originally proposed in the ACRF, why was ACRF not 
better received?  
Unfortunately, due to the short life-span of the ACRF 
proposal, the existing literature tends to blur the 
distinctions between the proposal for a force and the 
proposal for a bi-lateral initiative, obscuring why the ACRF 
proposal failed and precluding a fuller analysis and 
explanation.14 There are two strands to the usual 
explanation for ACRF’s failure.  The first emphasizes the ad 
hoc and reactive nature of the proposal.  Authors in this 
camp argue that ACRF’s reactionary nature, driven as it was 
by the worsening situation in Burundi and anchored in the 
recent failures in Somalia and Rwanda, undermined its 
acceptance because African governments saw it as an excuse 
for the U.S./international community to do nothing and not 
get called out for it, rather than as a serious proposal for 
                     
14 Werner Biermann, African Crisis Response Initiative: The New U.S. 
Africa Policy (Hamburg and Piscataway, NJ: Lit; Distributed in North 
America by Transaction Publishers, 1999); L. D. Ruggley and Army War 
College (U.S.), African Crisis Response Initiative a Refocus (Carlisle, 
PA: U.S. Army War College, 2001); Korwa G. Adar, “The Clinton 
Administration and Africa: A View from Nairobi, Kenya,” Issue: A Journal 
of Opinion, 26, no. 2 (1998):70-74; H. Campbell, The US Security 
Doctrines and the Africa Crisis Response Initiative, S.l.: s.n., 1999. 
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a potentially successful solution to crises on the 
continent.15  The second explanation is not a low level of 
commitment by the Department of Defense (DoD) undermined 
ACRF’s acceptance on the continent.  Andrea Pollard, for 
example, argues that the ACRF’s intended organization, 
training and equipment fell short of Department of Defense 
standards, suggesting a lack of commitment, which undermined 
ACRF’s viability as a peacekeeping force.16  However, 
neither explanation examines the link between ACRF (its 
reactionary nature or its internal organization) and its 
actual acceptance/rejection by African governments.17   
Indeed, the literature tends to place the cart before 
the horse since the early rejection of the ACRF made its 
potential effectiveness moot, and no government publicly 
rejected it over concerns about its efficacy, although 
nearly every study of ACRF suggests public diplomacy 
weakness, none provides a systematic analysis of the effect 
of informational successes and failures on ACRF’s reception.  
This study seeks to fill this gap in the literature on the 
ACRF, analyzing the variation in acceptance/rejection among 
target countries – variation that has been largely ignored 
in the existing literature.   
                     
15 Werner Biermann, African Crisis Response Initiative: The New U.S. 
Africa Policy (Hamburg and Piscataway, NJ: Lit; Distributed in North 
America by Transaction Publishers, 1999); L. D. Ruggley and Army War 
College (U.S.), African Crisis Response Initiative a Refocus (Carlisle, 
PA: U.S. Army War College, 2001). 
16 Analysis of the Measures of Effectiveness for the African Crisis 
Response Initiative (U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2000). 
17 G. J. Ikenberry, “Ambiguous Order: Military Forces in African 
States (Review of the Book Ambiguous Order: Military Forces in African 
States),” Foreign Affairs, February 2002.  
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Such an evaluation of previous DSPD initiatives is 
essential given growing U.S. security and diplomatic 
interests in Sub-Saharan Africa.  The ACRF case can provide 
useful lessons for USAFRICOM in how to communicate more 
effectively with African partners. From a more narrow DSPD 
perspective, the absence of an explicit adversary in Africa 
means that military tactics there should be focused on 
capturing “human terrain” through the robust utilization of 
information operations rather than more conventional 
stratagems.18  To accomplish this, the Department of Defense 
needs to understand how to communicate effectively with 
Africans.  The command’s focus on interagency cooperation 
and building partnerships with African states makes 
successful Information Operations even more critical and the 
role of DPSD even more central to ensuring that Department 
of Defense actions align with and complement other elements 
of national power to synchronize an American grand strategy 
in Africa.19  
The focus in this thesis is on informational causal 
mechanisms, defined as the “physical, social, or 
psychological processes through which agents with causal 
capacities operate, but only in specific contexts or 
conditions, to transfer energy, information, or matter to 
other entities.”20 Using Wilbur Schramm’s disaggregation of 
                     
18 “Headquarters, Dept. of the Army: Headquarters, Marine Corps 
Combat Development Command, Dept. of the Navy, Headquarters, U.S. Marine 
Corps,” Counterinsurgency, 2006. 
19 Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq 
(New York: Penguin Press, 2006). 
20 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory 
Development in the Social Sciences, BCSIA Studies in International 
Security (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 37.  
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communications into a source and message, the case studies 
will treat the ACRF’s and related Defense Support for Public 
Diplomacy (DSPD) sources and messages as independent 
variables, and the acceptance or rejection of ACRF as the 
dependent variable.  The target audience is composed of the 
state level actors who possessed the ability to accept or 
reject the ACRF proposal.  This hypothesis is depicted in 
Figure 1. 





Figure 1.   ACRF DSPD: Causal Process.  
To measure the dependent variable, the joint DoD 
definition of ‘effect’ is utilized.  An effect is a change 
to a condition, behavior, or degree of freedom upon a given 
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target.21 In this case, the observed effect upon the target 
audience will be compared to the objective of the associated 
source and message.  Since the ACRF proposal solicited state 
membership, the target audiences will be viewed as the 
African decision makers and ruling elites. For the purposes 
of this research, it was initially assumed that Sub-Saharan 
African target audiences have broadly similar 
characteristics.22  This assumption was supported by a 
consensus in the marketing literature that the Sub-Saharan 
market is unique, but with little internal variation.23  
Thus, variations in effects were initially attributed to the 
source and message rather than potential variations in the 
target audience across cases.  However, the initial results 
reported in Chapter II reveal that this working assumption 
is not always valid.  Therefore, the analysis goes on in 
Chapter III to consider country specific antecedent 
conditions that mediate the relationship between the 
theorized IVs and DV.  
ACRF membership was not offered to all Sub-Saharan 
African states.  First, only democratic states were 
eligible.  Second, since ACRF proposed a force rather than a 
treaty, not all states possessed sufficiently capable 
defense forces to warrant membership in it.  Finally, since 
the ACRF was intended to be an African sourced and led 
                     
21 Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of 
Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Ft. Belvoir: 
Defense Technical Information Center, 2005), 176. 
22 Since the ACRF proposal only possessed the ability to change its 
source and message, the destination portion of Schramm’s model remains 
static. Therefore, the target audience or destination represents a true 
constant condition at the time of the ACRF proposal. 
23 S. Malumo, Introduction to Marketing in Africa (London: Macmillan, 
1986). 
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force, it required states not only to provide troops, but 
also the skill and logistical sustainment to enable the 
ACRF’s deployment and operation.  Force enablers included 
the capability to command, control, communicate and sustain 
the ACRF.  Since the purpose of this research is to evaluate 
the effects of communications from the U.S. on potential 
contributors, only states that were invited to participate 
are considered.   
Because Africa has historically been low on the U.S. 
foreign policy agenda, communications have often come from 
relatively low level officials, sometimes sending mixed 
messages or giving ultimatums, and generally not taking the 
time to go to Africa to consult with ‘partners’ there.24  
This sends certain signals to the target audience, while 
also communicating a general disregard for the region by the 
U.S. policymaking establishment, thereby reducing the 
receptivity of the target audience to the message content.  
Thus, the thesis’ central hypothesis is that the use of a 
high level source with a shaping message objective, at the 
target audience’s home venue offers a more effective 
informational strategy, which maximizes the probability of 
acceptance by the target audience.   
Defense Support for Public Diplomacy (DSPD) source and 
messages are multi-faceted independent variables.  Both 
overt and unclassified DSPD came from clearly attributable 
sources.  The sources will be identified according to the 
 
 
                     
24 Christopher S. Clapham, Africa and the International System: The 
Politics of State Survival, Cambridge Studies in International Relations 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 50, 111-118. 
 11
state of origin, associated organization and, when possible, 
the status of the message’s originator.  Table 1 illustrates 
this. 
State of Origin Organization/Billet Level 
U.S. Department of State, 
Secretary 
High 
U.S. U.S. European Command, 
J-3 
Medium 
U.S. 26th MEU, Public Affair 
Officer 
Low 
Table 1.  Example Source Description Method 
The message variable possesses two elements: objective 
and venue.  Messages also include content, but in the case 
of ACRF the content is a constant: all target states were 
invited to participate in the ACRF.  
The combination of objective and venue comprises the 
measure of the message variable.  Four non-doctrinal 
definitions of commonly used information operations 
objectives – shape, inform, convince, and influence – help 
us classify the objective element of the message variable 
(Table 2).  The objective is the most important element in 
DSPD because it expresses the nature of the engagement. 
Venue describes the location of the delivery, and is coded 
as being internal or external to the target audience’s 
country.  If the message was delivered in the target 
audience’s country, then it was resident.  If not, then the 




Objective Category Definition 
Inform Make target audience aware of 
message content. 
Shape Line of Persuasion (LOP) to 
achieve long term target 
audience consent regarding the 
totality of the message’s 
content. 
Influence Line of Persuasion (LOP) to 
achieve near term target 
audience consent regarding 
message content. 
Convince Line of Persuasion (LOP) to 
achieve immediate target 
audience consent regarding 
message content.  
Table 2.  Message Objective Definitions 
Measurement of the dependent variable, commonly 
described as the Measure of Effectiveness or MOE, indicates 
whether the proposal’s target audience accepts or declines 
participation in the ACRF.  Rather than express the MOE as a 
binomial assessment of accept/reject, a relative scale was 
established as depicted in Figure 2.  An MOE of zero 
represents no evidence of either ACRF acceptance or 
rejection.  A positive or negative ‘1’ suggests a “soft” 
acceptance or rejection respectively.  This value is 
assigned to the DV when the preponderance of evidence 
indicates that a decision was made, but the decision was not 
made public.  A positive or negative ‘2’ indicates public 
acceptance or rejection of the ACRF.  Though not perfect, 
the MOE scale is useful as a measure of the dependent 
variable because it provides a metric of the DSPD success.  
 13
 
Figure 2.   ACRF MOE Scale 
The next chapter tests the thesis’ hypothesis based on 
available data for all states that the U.S. publicly invited 
to participate in ACRF.  It finds that the independent 
variables outlined above do not adequately explain the 
variation in the dependent variable.  Therefore, Chapter III 
examines contextual factors in each case that seem to have 
preempted the expected relationship between the IVs and DV.  
Chapter III also includes a discussion of Nigeria’s role in 
the continent’s consideration of the ACRF proposal.  
Although Nigeria was disqualified from participation, as a 
regional and continental power its position likely 
influenced opens decisions.  The thesis then concludes with 
a summary of findings, and a discussion of their 
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II. EFFECT OF DPSD SOURCE AND MESSAGE ON DECISIONS 
OF PROSPECTIVE ACRF PARTICIPANTS 
Since the ACRF proposal required the immediate creation 
of a force capable of deploying within a short time, ten 
states were asked to join at its inception.  Two of the ten 
received private invitations.25  “The invited provider 
states were selected on the grounds of good governance, 
security force capacity, and military proficiency to meet 
the near term deadline for establishing an operational 
force. It was anticipated that seven of these would be force 
providers (Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Mali, Ghana, Senegal, 
and Tanzania) and that the eighth, South Africa, would 
assume responsibility for command and control as the force 
enabler.26  While many states were suitable as force 
providers, South Africa was the only real candidate for a 
force enabler role.27 Being the force enabler for ACRF 
required providing the headquarters element of the ten 
battalion sized brigade.  The primary enabling function of 
                     
25 Chris Mcgreal, "Africans Give Christopher Cool Response; President 
Moi of Kenya Barely Hid his Hostility towards America," The Guardian 
(London) October 12, 1996, 13. The two private invitees are most likely 
Botswana and Malawi, which were not publicly invited to participate but 
announced their agreement to participate in 1997. Eric Berman and Katie 
E. Sams, Peacekeeping in Africa Capabilities and Culpabilities (Geneva; 
Pretoria: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Institute 
for Security Studies, 2000). 
26 Eugene M. Mensch II, US Army Attaché, Pretoria, South Africa, 
1996-1999, e-mail message, July 17, 2008. 
27 Eugene M. Mensch II, US Army Attaché, Pretoria, South Africa, 
1996-1999, e-mail message, July 17, 2008. Given Nigeria’s 
ineligibility, Kenya’s refusal to join, and Ethiopia’s acceptance only 
as a force provider, South Africa became the only realistic candidate to 
command the force. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) was 
also approached as a candidate for the force enabler role, but the 
primary reason for SADC’s candidacy was again South Africa’s 
capabilities, “U.S. 'Will Do Its Part' in Africa,” AllAfrica.com, 
October 13, 1996. 
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the brigade headquarters would be to command and control 
(C2) the ACRF through its deployment and operation.  As a 
result, despite the title, the ACRF possessed restricted 
membership by design, but was still broad enough to yield an 
independent deployable brigade.28 
The following DSPD analysis focuses on the eight 
countries that were asked publicly to participate.  Since 
the focus of the study is public diplomacy, private 
invitations and closed channel processes are excluded from 
analysis, with the recognition that excluded private 
communications may have effects on outcomes that are not 
captured in the analysis.  Due to a combination of the 
force’s hasty conception and short lifespan, the 
preponderance of DSPD for the ACRF proposal centered on 
Secretary of State, Warren Christopher’s six day trip to 
Africa during October 1996.29  Details of Christopher’s 
first and only trip to Africa, and its purpose of creating a 
continental peacekeeping force, became public knowledge on 
September, 29, 1996.30 On October 9, Christopher arrived in 
Bamako, Mali.  Mali publicly accepted the ACRF proposal on 
the same day.31 The next day, Christopher departed for Addis 
Abba, Ethiopia for an OAU conference.  At the conference, 
                     
28 Larry D. Ruggley, African Crisis Response Initiative: A Refocus 
(Ft. Belvoir: Defense Technical Information Center, 2001), 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA389675 (accessed September, 10, 2008), 
9. 
29 Werner Biermann, African Crisis Response Initiative: The New U.S. 
Africa Policy, Hamburg and Piscataway, NJ: Lit, Distributed in North 
America by Transaction Publishers, 1999. 
30 Warren Christopher, “Meet the Press,” September 29, 1996, 
http://www.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/ (accessed September 23, 2008), 
1.  
31 Thomas W. Lippman, “Mali is First to Sign on to African Force,” 
The Washington Post, October 9, 1996, 
http://www.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/ (accessed May 10, 2008).  
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Christopher discussed and promoted the merits of the ACRF.32  
On October 11, he flew to Arusha, Tanzania where Kenya, 
Uganda and Tanzania were offered ACRF membership.  Uganda 
accepted the proposal while Kenya declined.33  On October 12 
and 13, Christopher engaged President Mandela in South 
Africa.  Mandela agreed with the broad concept, in that a 
regional peacekeeping force could promote security and 
stability, but rejected the ACRF based on the lack of 
consultation with Africans before the plan was announced, 
and concerns about the U.S., rather than the UN, being in a 
position to affect its operation.34  Following these public 
comments, Christopher and other U.S. officials engaged 
Mandela in further rounds of discussion, establishing a 
collegial exchange not in evidence elsewhere.    
On October 14, Ethiopia announced its acceptance of the 
proposal, pledging to supply two battalions of soldiers.35 
The same day, Christopher flew to Luanda, Angola, on other 
                     
32 Robin Wright, “Christopher Urges Africa to Create Crisis Force; 
Military: U.S. Would Help Pay for Multinational Rapid Response Unit to 
Provide Peacekeepers and Humanitarian Relief for Wars and Disasters,” 
Los Angeles Times (pre-1997 Full text), (Home Edition), 
October 11, 1996, http://www.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/ (accessed 
May 5, 2008).  
33 Agence France Presse, "Kenya Has Serious Reservations about 
Burundi Force: Moi," Agence France Presse – English, July 15, 1996, 
Lexis Nexis, March 25, 2008, www.lexisnexis.com (accessed September 
2008). 
34 Bob Drogin and Robin Wright, “Christopher's Enthusiasm, S. 
Africa's Reception at Odds,” Los Angeles Times (pre-1997 Full 
Text), (Home Edition), October 13, 1996, 
http://www.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/ (accessed September 11, 2008).  
35 Agence France Presse, "Ethiopia Willing to Take Part in African 
Force: U.S.," Agence France Presse – English, October 9, 1996, Lexis 
Nexis Academic, March 7, 2008, www.lexisnexis.com (accessed September 
2008). 
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business, before returning to the U.S. on October 15.36  On 
October 28, both Ghana and Tanzania publicly announced their 
acceptance of the ACRF.37  The only other act in the DSPD as 
it relates to the ACRF, was a high level military visit to 
Senegal on January 7, 1997 to discuss the details of the 
ACRF.  This announcement confirmed Senegal’s private 
acceptance of ACRF.   
After six months of private diplomacy targeting the two 
states that had not accepted ACRF, Kenya and South Africa, 
the U.S. ceased use of the term ACRF, and moved ahead with 
the ACRI training program in July.  This was a response to 
the failure to secure a force enabler, even though hopes 
remained that South Africa might later take on the role.  
When South Africa did not, ACRI became a bilateral program 
for training forces to participate in UN peacekeeping 
missions.   
Overall, Christopher’s trip netted six acceptances and 
two rejections for the ACRF.   
A. SELLING THE ACRF TO THE FORCE PROVIDERS AND ENABLER  
To evaluate the DSPD process, this study used Lexis 
Nexis Academic, Proquest and Torpedo Ultra database searches 
of the world news media.  Each instance of defense support 
for the bid from its announcement in September 1996 to its 
de facto abandonment in July 1997 was coded as a relevant 
message. Each instance of direct and related DSPD in the 
                     
36 Thomas W. Lippman, “Christopher's Africa Trip Stirs Hopes, Fears 
for Complicated Continent,” The Washington Post, October 16, 
1996, http://www.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/  (accessed May 5, 2008).  
37 "Five ECOWAS Members Agree to Send Troops for Peacekeeping," BBC 
Summary of World Broadcasts, November 11, 1996. 
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media reports was then coded for its source, message 
objective, and venue.  Due to the short duration of the DSPD 
process, the invited participant states are evaluated 
together in the following analysis. 
1. DSPD Source 
The primary source used in the DSPD process for all 
eight states, and the only one for six of them, was 
Secretary of State Christopher, an exceptionally high level 
source for Sub-Saharan Africa, who brought the message to 
the continent.38 In Ethiopian, multiple engagements on 
military-to-military matters preceding the ACRF proposal 
served as DSPD for the ACRF although not originally intended 
as such.  
First, on February 7, 1996, U.S. Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs 
Vincent Kern visited Addis Ababa and pledged assistance to 
the Ethiopian army in discussions with the Ethiopian 
Parliamentary Defense Committee, led by House Speaker Dawit 
Yohannes.39 Kern was a medium level source.  Next, on April 
26, 1996, the day the United Nations called for sanctions 
against Sudan, CIA Director John Deutch visited Ethiopia.  
On June 20, 1996 a high level U.S. military delegation led 
by Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Joseph 
Ralston met with Ethiopian Deputy Prime Minister and Defense 
 
 
                     
38 Gumisai Mutume, "Africa-U.S.: Christopher Winds Up African Trip," 
IPS-Inter Press Service, October 14, 1996. 
39 "US Official Pledges Assistance To Ethiopia's Army," Xinhua News 
Agency, February 7, 1996. 
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Minister Tamirat Layne to discuss ways of beefing up the 
organizational capacity of the Ethiopian air force.40  
Deutch and Ralston were both high level sources.   
In the Ghanaian case, U.S. Assistant Secretary of 
State for African Affairs George Moose held discussions 
reported to have dealt with ACRF behind closed doors with 
President Jerry Rawlings immediately preceding 
Christopher’s trip.41 Moose was a medium level source. 
Overall then, the sources used in the DSPD process for 
the ACRF are surprisingly few, and infrequently employed 
given the scope of the proposal being made.  For Ethiopia, 
the level and frequency of sources utilized resulted from 
the pre-existing trajectory of Ethiopian and U.S. relations 
that aligned with the ACRF proposal largely 
unintentionally.  Secretary Moose’s visit to Ghana 
represented a lower level source which, while directly 
supporting the ACRF proposal, was motivated primarily by 
other foreign policy initiatives.  Thus, it seems clear 
that the DSPD strategy associated with ACRF was very 
limited even within the context of the time available. 
2. DSPD Message Objective 
While the content of the DSPD message was consistently 
a request for participation in the ACRF, the message 
objective varied across countries.  The most common 
objective was ‘convince,’ seeking to achieve immediate 
target audience consent. Because of the limited DSPD 
                     
40 "Ethiopian Deputy PM Meets US Military Delegation," Xinhua News 
Agency, June 20, 1996. 
41 Pan-African News Agency, "United States and Africa; United States 
Official Meets President Rawlings," Africa News, October 1, 1996. 
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occurrences connected with the proposal, the single, short 
fused offer associated with Christopher’s visit is 
classified as ‘convince’ for Kenya, Mali, Tanzania, Uganda 
and Senegal.  In the case of Ethiopia, even though Secretary 
Christopher made the same offer for the ACRF, the DSPD 
interaction with Ethiopia in the months prior to 
Christopher’s visit established a shaping objective, since 
the ACRF proposal came in the context of ongoing 
consultations over a larger program of cooperation between 
the U.S. and Ethiopian armed forces.  In South Africa, the 
open discussion between Mandela and Christopher indicates a 
shift in objective from ‘convince’ to ‘influence’, 
attempting to achieve near term (rather than immediate) 
target audience consent.      
3. DSPD Venue 
The DSPD venue was external to the target audience in 
Ghana, Uganda and Kenya, and resident from the other five 
states.  Prior to the proposal, Ghana and Ethiopia received 
resident bilateral DSPD communications from U.S. officials.  
During Christopher’s visit, Mali and South Africa received 
similar resident bilateral communications.  Christopher 
visited Ethiopia to address the OAU, and actually discussed 
the ACRF proposal with Ethiopian officials in Arusha, 
Tanzania, along with officials from Kenya, Uganda and 
Tanzania.   After the proposal tour, the only DSPD related 
to the ACRF was a bilateral meeting in Senegal.  Thus, all 
of the communications for ACRF were delivered on the African 
continent, although not always in the target state’s own 
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country.  Give that the proposal was for a multilateral 
initiative, the mix of resident and external but continental 
contacts was perhaps appropriate. 
4. DSPD Measure of Effectiveness (MOE) 
For Mali, the immediate lead acceptances of the 
proposal constituted a soft accept.  Uganda’s and Tanzania’s 
delayed acceptance, without a definitive promise of pledging 
troops is considered a soft accept.  Kenya immediately 
rejected the ACRF, making the DSPD MOE a hard reject.  South 
Africa’s response was delayed as was the acceptance of 
Uganda and Tanzania and therefore considered soft since it 
involved consideration. Although Senegal eventually accepted 
the ACRF, initially the nation provided no public response 
to the offer.  In January 1997, Senegal softly accepted the 
ACRF, making its MOE a soft accept.    
5. Findings 
Overall, source level does not appear to have 
significantly affected the probable acceptance of the ACRF 
by target states.  The source was consistently high level, 
which cannot explain the variation in acceptance/rejection.  
Frequency does not appear to explain variations either, as 
the strongest acceptances came from Mali and Ethiopia, on 
opposite ends of the frequency spectrum.  Similarly, there 
is no clear correlation between message objective and 
acceptance or rejection.  Countries that received ‘convince’ 
objectives accepted and declined, while those that received 
softer objectives also went both ways, Ethiopia accepting 
and South Africa declining. Venue also does not appear to 
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have significantly affected the probability of acceptance.  
Of the three nations that received the ACRF proposal 
external to their target audience, two (Ghana and Uganda) 
accepted the proposal. Of the five nations that received the 
ACRF proposal with their target audiences, South Africa was 
the only nation to reject the offer.  While a higher 
percentage of nations accepted the ACRF proposal when it was 
pitched a resident venue with the target audience (80% to 
66%) the evidence nevertheless suggests that venue did not 
significantly affect the probability of acceptance.   
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B. CONCLUSION 
Based on the inconsistent results across cases, the 
study’s hypothesis is not supported.  The failure of the 
theory to predict outcomes correctly suggests that country 
specific contextual factors are more important than 
originally theorized.  The impromptu manner and the short 
lifespan of the ACRF meant that decisions were significantly 
affected by the state of each country’s relationship with 
the U.S. at the precise moment the proposal was launched.  
As a result of this conclusion, the next chapter will 











III. CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS OF THE DPSD SOURCE, MESSAGE 
AND EFFECT ON THE ACRF PROPOSAL 
This chapter argues that because no time existed to 
implement a well thought out marketing strategy, decisions 
by target states were made largely based on inertia – those 
with good U.S. relations that year were inclined to support 
the proposal, those without were not. This chapter is 
dedicated to an assessment of how bilateral relations shaped 
responses to the ACRF proposal. It concludes with a 
discussion of the lateral role of Nigeria’s exclusion from 
the ACRF.  
At the most general level, responses of African states 
to U.S. initiatives reflect the history of U.S. relations 
with the continent.  Former Assistant Secretary of State for 
Africa Herman J. Cohen asserted in 1995 that he had yet to 
see a credible definition of U.S. national security 
interests on the continent beyond the Israel-Egypt-Persian 
Gulf nexus.42  Africanist scholar Peter J. Schraeder 
concurred, arguing in 1994 that: “No other continent has 
been so consistently ignored by our policy-makers, and yet 
none but Europe has been so continually connected to 
important developments in America.”43 Official U.S. policy 
in the 1990s more or less embraced this marginalization of 
Africa.44  The 1998 U.S. National Security Strategy defines 
                     
42 Herman J. Cohen, "US Policy toward Africa," Foreign Service 
Journal, June 1995, 38. 
43 Peter J. Schraeder, United States Foreign Policy toward Africa: 
Incrementalism, Crisis, and Change, Cambridge Studies in International 
Relations, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 1, 31. 
44 Salih Booker, "Thinking Regionally about Africa," Peace Research 
Abstracts 38, no. 2, (2001). 
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Africa as the lowest priority amongst the world’s regions.45  
The first sentence of the 1995 United States security 
strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa maintains that, “American 
Security interests in Sub-Saharan Africa are very 
limited.”46  However, even at the time there were 
indications of the growing importance of Sub-Saharan Africa 
for the U.S.47 For instance, the U.S. military used force in 
Africa more than any other geographic region during the 
1990s, but listed it as the least important geographic area 
in its official security strategy.48 East Africa was 
expecting more attention given the evolving primacy of U.S. 
Central Command military operations in the Middle East, even 
as the U.S. considered abandoning the region since it saw no 
significant post-Cold War interests there. But even as the 
U.S. attempted to turn away from Africa, the continent’s 
weak states and humanitarian crises threatened to require 
continuous U.S. involvement.49 Out of this context came the 
proposal for the ACRF, perceived as a similar blend of 
engagement and dismissal.  In turn, we might expect African 
states varied responses to be equally ambivalent.  
                     
45 United States, A National Security Strategy for a New Century, 
White House, Office of the President of the United States (Washington, 
D.C., 1997), 54-57. 
46 United States, United States Security Strategy for Sub-Saharan 
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 A. THE MODAL RESPONSE TO ACRF: SOFT ACCEPT 
The most common response to the ACRF proposal was to 
take it under advisement and then quietly accept it without 
making any concrete offer of troops or other support. From 
an objective point of view this would have to be judged a 
logical response from small weak states to a superpower 
proposal about which many had doubts.  The states that made 
this decision generally had limited but good relations with 
the U.S.  None were regional powers, and thus none saw 
themselves as major players beyond their own borders.  When 
there were no contextual factors pushing them to a more 
enthusiastic embrace of multilateral security cooperation 
with the U.S., and none pushing them away from it, target 
audiences consistently made a soft accept decision, 
anticipating small direct and indirect benefits and minimal 
costs.   
1. Uganda 
By the mid 1990s, Uganda was being praised by the U.S. 
for its success in moving beyond its previous chaotic 
conditions and creating a constitutional government, 
economic reform, and creating a sense of future optimism.50  
Uganda still faced significant internal security problems 
from the low intensity insurgency of the Lord’s Resistance 
                     
49 Steven Metz, Refining American Strategy in Africa (Carlisle, PA: 
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2000), 7-12. 
50 United States, Africa: Potential and Promise: Hearing before the 
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Army to the fallout from the Rwandan genocide,51 which 
included instability in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(then Zaire), and the creeping genocide in Burundi.  Most 
worrisome from the Ugandan perspective was the security 
threat posed by Sudan on its northern border.52  The idea 
that Uganda had an interest in regional peacekeeping was 
supported by the series of letters from President Museveni 
to the UN Security Council asking for action against 
Sudan.53 Shared security concerns in the East African sub-
region acted as an additional driving factor in establishing 
close friendly relations between Uganda and the United 
States.   
Nevertheless, President Museveni was not inclined to 
embrace a singular alliance with the United States, seeking 
instead to build a network of alliances to better serve 
Ugandan interests.  He hosted U.S. Secretary of Commerce Ron 
Brown as the two promoted their shared commitment to ‘trade 
not aid.’54 The high level visit signaled a new era in the 
Uganda-United States relationship, after decades of state 
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collapse and violence in Uganda. However, Museveni’s 
government also hosted the President Rafsanjani of Iran, to 
the dissatisfaction of the U.S. government.55  The small, 
but politically important Ugandan Muslim population turned 
up in droves to see Rafsanjani.  Like Brown, Rafsanjani 
brought a message of goodwill and economic investment, 
providing Uganda improved prospects for growth.   
This broad appeal to outside partners explains why 
Uganda chose a soft rather than hard accept, despite its 
many shared interests and relatively strong relationship 
with the U.S. 
2. Tanzania 
Given its early embrace of African Socialism, Tanzania 
had always been committed to non-alignment.56 Nevertheless, 
by the 1990s, Tanzania like other African countries, had 
accepted the necessity of political and economic cooperation 
with the West, and was implementing political and economic 
liberalization.57 Tanzania’s position on the continent was 
somewhat paradoxical, having always played a leadership role 
on Southern and East African issues, while being extremely 
dependent on external aid.   
Between late 1994 and 1996, Tanzania had to deal with a 
considerable refugee problem stemming from the Rwanda 
genocide. Nearly a million Hutu refugees residing in 
Tanzania feared reprisals from the now Tutsi led government 
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in Rwanda, and refused to return home.  This problem would 
have been significantly exacerbated by an increase in 
violence in Burundi; indeed Tanzania was already receiving 
Burundian refugees on a daily basis.  Thus, Tanzania shared 
U.S. concerns over Burundi, but lacked the stronger security 
concerns associated with the threat from a radical Islamist 
government in Sudan.  Beyond that, U.S.-Tanzania relations 
were positive, but very limited, predisposing Tanzania to a 
soft accept of ACRF. 
3. Ghana 
Ghana’s move towards democratization became apparent in 
1996, following a flawed election in 1992 that represented 
an engineered civilianization of Rawlings’ military rule.  
This liberalization, particularly the opening of political 
space for the growth of civic institutions, produced a 
favorable response from the United States, and led to 
improved relations between the two countries.58  It is 
significant that the December 1996 elections were imminent 
when the ACRF was proposed, since Ghana’s selection as one 
of the ‘democratic’ states tended to legitimize President 
Rawlings’ claim to have transformed himself fully from coup 
maker to democratic leader.59 In addition, Ghana’s 
willingness to participate in peacekeeping missions, and 
demonstrated ability to do so professionally, led the U.S. 
                     
58 United States, Background Notes, Ghana (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
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to seek improved relations with it.60 At the same time, the 
unpredictability of events in conflict-ridden West Africa 
during the 1990s heightened Ghana’s interest in improving 
the continent’s security architecture.61 Thus, U.S.-Ghanaian 
relations were on a favorable trajectory when ACRF was 
proposed, which made Ghana more inclined to support it.  On 
the other hand, the relationship was not so strong as to 
eliminate Ghana’s need to accommodate the sub-region’s 
natural hegemony and would-be peacekeeper, Nigeria.   
4. Senegal 
Senegal and the U.S. were drifting toward favorable 
relations based on mutual interests at the time of the ACRF.  
In addition to sharing Ghana’s regional security concerns, 
Senegal was seeking to diversify its partnerships amongst 
Western states as a means of balancing its strong 
relationship and heavy dependence on France, while boosting 
its role as a regional actor in competition with Nigeria and 
Côte d’Ivoire.62 This reorientation had been demonstrated by 
Senegal’s deployment of forces in support of the ECOWAS 
Monitoring Group in Liberia with U.S. encouragement and 
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assistance, and in the face of French opposition.63   
Initially, Senegal did not publicly accept or reject the 
ACRF proposal, to which France openly objected.64 Senegal 
had to walk a delicate line between its traditional patron 
and its new one. As a result, Senegal took a low visibility 
position, accepting ACRF only privately, and softly.   
B. ENTHUSIASTIC SUPPORT FOR ACRF 
1. Ethiopa 
Ethiopia was the only target state to strongly embrace 
ACRF, which IT did based on significant shared security 
interests with the U.S. and more serious engagement by the 
U.S. in the years before the proposal.  The fall of Mengistu 
Haile Mariam’s Marxist government in 1991 had created an 
opportunity for renewal of the historically close U.S.-
Ethiopian relationship.  The U.S. government supported the 
rebel Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front’s 
transition to power in Addis Ababa by negotiation and BY 
facilitating a soft landing and a smooth withdrawal of 
government forces.  The U.S. went on to work with the 
Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) as it established 
itself and consolidated its authority, supporting its 
efforts to achieve democratization, human rights and 
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economic reform.65 Within thirty months of assuming power, 
the TGE conducted a marginally successful national election, 
drafted a constitution and established a fundamentally 
democratic government.66 In a July 1994 Congressional 
hearing, Assistant Secretary of State George E. Moose stated 
that the two countries’ relationship rested upon common 
regional interests, including in Sudan, Somalia and 
Rwanda.67  This assessment was shared by Ethiopia. 
There are many contributing factors to success of the 
renewal of U.S.-Ethiopian relations, but military concerns, 
as always, played a prominent role in shaping the bilateral 
relationship.68 U.S.-Ethiopian relations were rooted in 
military strategy from the time of the Second World War 
until the Marxist revolution of 1974.69  The end of the Cold 
War significantly altered the geographical importance of the 
Horn of Africa, but the rise of the threat of radical Islam 
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opportunities for U.S.-Ethiopian cooperation and a new 
impetus for both to strengthen military-to-military 
relations between the two states.70   
With the exception of the period of Marxist rule (1974-
1991), the United States and Ethiopia had always possessed a 
unique relationship.  During the first part of the Cold War, 
the United States cultivated its relationship with Ethiopia 
for its geographical position on the Red Sea.  Beyond 
Ethiopia’s favorable maritime positioning, the U.S. base at 
Kagnew was an invaluable resource for signals intelligence 
against the former Soviet Union.71  The fundamentally 
conservative Christian monarchy in Ethiopia looked to the 
United States for support against threatening ideologies and 
neighbors. Then came Marxist rule, when the U.S. adopted a 
regional containment policy, switching its support and 
assets to neighboring Somalia, as the Mengistu government 
aligned with the former Soviet Union.72  It was only 
beginning again in 1991 that the two nations resumed 
favorable relations.73   
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However, the renewal of favorable U.S.-Ethiopia 
relations represented more than a return to the status 
quo.74  The end of the Cold War further strengthened U.S.-
Ethiopian relations by eliminating external competition for 
influence in the region and allowing the two states to 
cooperate on addressing security concerns across the Horn of 
Africa. This context explains Ethiopia’s extraordinary 
enthusiasm for extending its growing military-to-military 
partnership with the U.S. in general, and participation in 
the ACRF in particular.  
2. Mali 
Mali’s strong accept of ACRF is a bit more difficult to 
explain.  Mali had made great strides in political 
liberalization in the early 1990s and improved its 
relationship with the U.S., as had the other soft accept 
states.  In terms of military-to-military relations, the 
U.S. was contributing $1 million in funding for Mali’s 
demobilization of its Northern Tuareg rebel group at the end 
of a five year low intensity civil war. This would have been 
supplemented by ACRF training for Mali’s armed forces.75  
Thus, the most reasonable explanation for Mali’s greater 
than average enthusiasm for ACRF is the ongoing military-to-
military relationship, much as in the case of Ethiopia, but 
with a national rather than a regional focus. 
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C. HARD REJECTION 
1. Kenya 
In contrast with the general trend toward improved 
bilateral relations in the early 1990s, the U.S.-Kenyan 
relationship, always one of the strongest on the continent, 
became more rather than less strained after the end of the 
Cold War.  Kenya’s Cold War strategic security importance to 
the U.S. dwindled, while it played a much smaller role than 
Ethiopia in containing radical Islam in Sudan. In addition, 
the Moi government swam against the current, resisting 
pressure from the U.S. and other Western states for 
democratic reform.  In response, the U.S. withdrew most if 
its support to Kenya, launching a campaign in 1992 to freeze 
western and multilateral aid until multiparty democracy was 
adopted.  
As the United States promoted its democratization 
policy across Sub-Saharan Africa, Kenya was singled out as a 
constant target of criticism, even as equally non-democratic 
governments, such as that in Uganda, were silently embraced 
by the U.S.76 The Moi government considered this a betrayal 
of its support for the U.S. during the Cold War, when most 
other African states turned to the left.77 In January 1996, 
Congressman John Porter referred a resolution entitled the 
Kenya Human Rights Initiative (KHRI) to the House Africa 
Sub-Committee.   
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The increasingly hard line U.S. stance on democracy in 
Kenya was personified by its new Ambassador to Kenya, 
Prudence Bushnell.  Ambassador Bushnell was unpopular with 
the Kenyan target audience for her open criticism of the Moi 
government, which differed greatly from her predecessor 
Ambassador Brazeal’s less critical brand of diplomacy.  
Ambassador Bushnell employed a hard line approach in an 
attempt to force President Moi to initiate reforms, tackle 
corruption and incorporate democratic institutions.   
A series of unpopular American government efforts, 
however morally and politically justified, established a 
baseline disinclination to cooperate with the U.S. in 
general, and ACRF in particular, among the Kenyan target 
audience. Yet, Kenya was courted to lead ‘African solutions 
for African problems,’ even as it was chastised for failing 
to create democratic intuitions, institutions which it 
claimed were un-African.78  The tension between encouraging 
Kenyan to participate in regional security engagements, 
while simultaneously pressuring it to adopt political 
reforms that threatened the incumbent’s political survival, 
culminated first in Kenya’s firm and immediate refusal to 
support ACRF, and then in the United States declaring Kenya 
ineligible for the follow-on African Crisis Response 
Initiative based on its non-democratic governance.   
By the summer of 1996, Kenya’s position on sending 
forces into Burundi was outright negative.  At a conference 
called by Burundi’s president, President Moi, despite 
pressure from the United States and the European Union, 
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explicitly stated his opposition to any intervention in 
Burundi without the consent of all involved participants.79  
D. SOFT REJECTION 
1. South Africa 
In April 1994, the Republic of South Africa held its 
first elections not governed by racist apartheid laws.80  
The elections not only marked the end of apartheid, but a 
return of South Africa to the fold of the international 
community.  President Mandela’s election was one of the most 
important political transitions in modern history.81  Prior 
to the elections, the U.S. was cautious regarding the 
consequences of the transition from a regime with which it 
had formally had good relations, to a new government led by 
a Marxist liberation organization it once listed as a 
terrorist organization.82  
Both before and after the 1994 elections, the United 
States sought to support a smooth transition and to bolster 
non-racial democracy, while supporting economic growth and 
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redistribution.83 The two states established a bilateral 
commission to supplement traditional diplomatic channels to 
facilitate cooperation on issues of mutual concern.84  
Interaction between the two countries during South Africa’s 
transition to democratic rule illustrates three important 
facets of relations during the period when ACRF was being 
proposed.  First, South Africa is clearly a giant in Sub-
Saharan Africa destined to play a large role on the 
continent.85  Secondly, the political and ideological 
trajectory of South Africa coincided with U.S. diplomatic, 
national security, economic and informational goals during 
the post Cold War period allowing for a more common base on 
which to build relations.86  Finally, despite many shared 
interests, South Africa was clear that it would make its own 
path in the new world order because its foreign policy was 
in many ways dominated by domestic issues in the 1990s.87  
These three factors played a significant role in South 
Africa’s soft rejection of ACRF. 
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The South African Defense Forces (SADF) were the most 
competent and professional force on the continent.88 In 
addition, the SADF had played a positive role in the 
transition from apartheid, and remained professional and 
loyal to the new democratic black-led government.89 However, 
while South Africa clearly had the capacity to exercise 
military leadership on the continent, it forces were in the 
midst of a transition from white dominated military that had 
played a large role in suppressing the democratic 
transition, to a multiracial military that served all its 
citizens, under firm democratic civilian control.90  This 
required rapid training and advancement of black officers 
who would benefit from favorable engagement on a military-
to-military level with the United States.  Mandela 
understood South Africa’s natural responsibility to the 
continent, but he also understood his government’s very 
significant challenges in the realm of difficult political, 
economic, and social transformations at home.  On balance, 
this led his government to undertake military engagements on 
the continent selectively and carefully. 
The African National Congress (ANC) government was 
ambivalent in its relations with the United States.  The 
U.S. anti-apartheid movement had been of significant support 
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and the U.S. government has also supported the transition, 
if belatedly.  However, the U.S. government had staunchly 
opposed the ANC for decades, and in the 1990s the ANC and 
Mandela remained on the U.S. State Department’s terrorist 
list.  In addition, the ANC remained committed to friendly 
relations with those who supported its liberation struggle, 
to include Iran, Cuba, and Libya. This served as an irritant 
to the U.S.  Thus, there was a significant gap between the 
idealism of shared values between the two countries, and the 
reality of lingering tension over world affairs.91  
An additional key element in South Africa’s foreign 
policy and external relations is its position in and with 
sub-regional organizations.92  South Africa has a rational 
interest in supporting the South African Development 
Community (SADC) for a number of reasons.  First, SADC was 
initially formed to contain South African dominance in the 
region, and the change of regime in 1994 did not immediately 
eliminate the concerns of neighbors about its political, 
military, and economic dominance.  Second, the many cross 
border issues in the region blur the distinction between 
foreign and domestic policy, and require multilateral 
solutions.93  This means South Africa views SADC’s success 
as a vital national interest, and is careful to act in 
consultation with it.94 South Africa wanted the ACRF 
integrated into the UN, OAU, and SADC frameworks both as a 
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means to reduce U.S. influence over its use and as a means 
to support more truly African solutions to African problems, 
much as major powers generally prefer UN action to 
unilateral action on security issues.95 As a result, South 
Africa was willing to entertain the ACRF proposal, but not 
to accept it on the terms, which ultimately led to its soft 
reject decision. 
E. NIGERIA’S SPOILER ROLE 
Nigeria, a major power in West Africa, was prohibited 
from ACRF participation due its military regime.  Nigeria 
played a central role in the Economic Community of West 
African States’ (ECOWAS) security apparatus, the ECOWAS 
Monitoring Group (ECOMOG).96  If the motivation behind the 
ACRF proposal was “African Solutions for African Problems,” 
ECOMOG represented a viable, existing United Nations 
sanctioned force for dealing with African regional security 
issues.97 Therefore, the prohibition on Nigerian involvement 
represented a tacit rejection of the concept of possible, 
partial or full partnership with a pre-existing and active 
African crisis response capable force.98  ECOMOG’s poor 
performance as a crisis response force in Liberia and Sierra 
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Leone suggested a definite need for training to better 
fulfill ECOWAS’ political will in order will to resolve 
regional security issues.99   
Despite Nigeria’s prohibition from the ACRF, the United 
States provided $20 million dollars to fund ECOMOG in 
September 1996.  However, approximately one week prior to 
Secretary of State Warren Christopher’s African ACRF trip, 
President Clinton, in a White House memorandum to the 
Secretary of Defense, directed the following: 
I therefore direct the drawdown from the 
inventory and resources of the Department of 
Defense of an aggregate value not to exceed $10 
million in commodities and services to provide 
assistance to states currently participating 
(Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Mali), 
and for those states that may in the future 
participate, in ECOMOG to enhance ECOMOG's 
peacekeeping capabilities to bring about a 
peaceful solution to the crisis in Liberia.100 
Since Nigeria provided the majority of ECOMOG’s 
financial support, the move affected Nigeria almost 
exclusively.  If dollars serve as a barometer of political 
and military support, the drop in funding for ECOMOG can be 
considered both telling and confusing given the ACRF 
timeframe. Since, at the same time $10 million was being 
withdrawn from ECOMOG, Secretary of State Warren Christopher 
was offering a $20 million initial pledge for the ACRF, with 
a promise to pay a share of the estimated $20-45 million 
follow-on establishment costs, followed by an annual sum of 
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$5 million for the Force’s sustainment.101  Some might view 
the drop in financial support to ECOMOG timed with the 
pledge of support to the ACRF as a means to garner 
democratic West African states’ support for ACRF, while 
marginalizing the Nigerian led ECOMOG.102  This guaranteed 
Nigerian opposition, which could not have helped the ACRF 
proposal.  
F. CONCLUSION 
While the analysis in this chapter is necessarily 
impressionistic, it nevertheless suggests that bilateral 
relations and individual states’ interests, as they 
perceived them, were the key decisions related to acceptance 
or rejection of ACRF.  This means that the efficacy of DSPD 
strategies was, and will likely remain, bounded by these 
larger international relations and foreign policy factors, 
and that the U.S. government cannot approach African states 
as if they are all largely the same.   
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A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
This thesis set out to evaluate the effectiveness of 
Department of Defense (DoD) Defense Support for Public 
Diplomacy (DPSD) sources and messages using the African 
Crisis Response Force (ACRF) as a case study.  The thesis’ 
hypothesis posited a high level source, employing a shaping 
message aimed at the target audience in the target’s venue 
would yield the strongest acceptance.  The hypothesis was 
disproved based on the analysis of available evidence.  
However, further analysis of the impact of bilateral 
relationships on the decisions of African target states 
provides some insight into why simply the message, 
messenger, and venue are insufficient. 
Favorable relationships tend to make impromptu offers 
work.  When a security challenge emerges such as trouble in 
Burundi, the pre-existing relationship can make the message 
objective appear as informative, shaping and influencing 
versus a convincing ultimatum. This suggests a necessary 
persistence in the DSPD process to develop, maintain and 
sustain relations translates into a long term strategy that 
can accommodate near term dilemmas. Though not explicitly 
related to the ACRF, the frequent military-to-military 
interaction between Ethiopia and the U.S. made the ACRF 
offer, despite the proposal’s reactionary and impromptu 
manner, a next step in course of the to nation’s 
relationship.  The same conclusion can be drawn from the 
Ghana case.  By applying the same set of logic, the downturn 
between Kenya and the U.S.’s relationship would require 
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greater DSPD efforts.  The nature of the pre-existing 
relationship directly relates to the efficiency of the DSPD 
process therefore should not be ignored.   
From an external position, context directly affects 
the message, destination and effect.  In terms of best 
practices, Ethiopia, Ghana, and Senegal rank as the top 
examples in DPSD for the ACRF while Kenya and South Africa 
merited modification.  Even though the success of the 
Ethiopian case was due to renewed relations based on mutual 
security concerns, the approach, using constant and 
meaningful DSPD, resulted in Ethiopia’s hard accept.  Using 
a similar line of approach, Secretary Moose’s preparatory 
trip to Ghana before his very public proposal helped in 
gaining Ghana’s soft acceptance.  Although still a best 
practice example, Senegal’s success drastically differs 
from the high profile approaches used in Ethiopia and 
Ghana.  Predicated on Senegal’s need to walk a delicate 
line given its relationship with France and the U.S., a 
private approach eventually netted a soft acceptance.   
In looking at Kenya, the U.S.-Ethiopian example of 
renewing historically close ties should have been employed.  
If time did not permit the use of this approach, the U.S. 
could have weighed the risk of receiving a hard reject and 
could have employed a more informed proposal instead. 
Similarly, looking at the favorable relationship between 
South Africa and the U.S., an opportunity was missed to 
inform the South African audience of the U.S. desire to 
create the ACRF before it was publicly broached on a high 
profile trip. Mandela’s critiques regarding the ACRF’s 
failure to integrate with regional organizations and the 
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ACRF’s selective membership could have been rethought. 
Adjustments then could have been made to earn South 
Africa’s buy-in, especially since South Africa was the best 
candidate to assume ACRF’s command and control role.    
As a result, the figure used to depict Schramm’s 
heuristic to explain the thesis’ hypothesis would be 
revised to include the role and impact of context in any 
DSPD.  It should be noted that context equally applies to 
an internal and external role.  The internal role in 
Shramm’s communication heuristic applies the source. During 
the ACRF proposal, the U.S. public diplomacy and DSPD never 
took an introspective look at the very transparent nature 
of the ACRF in that the proposal reflected the standard 
criticism of U.S. policy and action in Africa.  
Consequently, had the U.S. looked at it its motivations, it 
would have seen the true nature of the ACRF.   
As seen with the South Africa case, product always 
matters in the sales process.  President Mandela’s public 
rationale for the rejection accurately identified the 
conceptual flaws of the ACRF.  While military strategy is 
subordinate to national strategy, the DSPD process requires 
good public policy to make the process effective. This is 
not to say that the ACRF was a poor idea without merit.  As 
stated in the introduction, multiple African regional 
peacekeeping forces emerged that closely resembled the ACRF 
within several years of the proposal’s demise.  That 
suggest that a better conceived DSPD could have helped sell 
the proposal.  In a sense, what ended up being the final 
proposal, could have been a starting point for mutual 
dialogue between the U.S. and the targeted nations.  
 48
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